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ALL EMPLOYEES ARE EQUAL, BUT SOME
EMPLOYEES ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS
Marianne Staniunast
I. INTRODUCTION
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,' the Supreme Court
denied an undocumented immigrant employee an award of limited back
pay against an employer who had fired him unlawfully. Even as the Court
maintained in the decision itself that undocumented immigrants are
recognized as full employees under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),2 it found that they nevertheless do not benefit from the full
protections of the NLRA.3 Holding that undocumented immigrants are
different in kind from other employees, the Court set the precedent that
employers who commit labor violations against undocumented immigrants
will not be penalized to the full extent authorized by the NLRA. The
significance of this decision reaches far beyond undocumented immigrants:
by distinguishing one group of employees to receive different treatment
under the NLRA, the Hoffman decision threatens to delegitimize the
National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) authority to enforce the legal
expectations and relationships among all employers and their employees,
which Congress created through the NLRA.
In deciding Hoffman, the Court reversed a legally reasonable decision
enforcing the NLRA4 by the NLRB, affirmed by the D.C. Circuit Court,5 to
f J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank
Professors Clyde Summers and Catherine Struve for their advice and editing assistance
throughout my writing of this comment.
1. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
2. Id. at 144-45.
3. Id. at 149-50.
4. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1998); see Hoffman, 535
U.S. at 161 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Board's position is, at the least, a reasonable
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award limited back pay to an undocumented immigrant, without
reinstatement, for the period extending from the unlawful discharge to the
point at which the employer became aware of the employee's
undocumented status.6 In reaching its decision, the Board had carefully
considered both the relevant Supreme Court precedent and the
congressional mandates of federal immigration policy. The Board
determined that its remedy appropriately enforced the penalties of the
NLRA against the employer while still serving the goals of federal
immigration policy by discouraging employment of illegal immigrants.7
The relevant immigration policy, the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA),8 criminalizes both the hiring of undocumented immigrants
and the use of false documents to obtain work, in an effort to disrupt illegal
immigration to the United States.9 The policy goals of IRCA harmonize
well with those of the NLRA'0 in that they seek to require employers to
maintain lawful and appropriate standards in the workplace. Employers
have had a history of avoiding-and continue to avoid-these standards by
hiring undocumented workers. Undocumented workers have feared
seeking enforcement of their rights as employees because of the significant
chance their immigration status would be revealed in the process.
Employers thus have taken advantage of their status and have forced them
to accept substandard wages and workplace conditions. Inevitably, this has
resulted in lowered standards for all individuals in affected portions of the
labor market: where United States citizens and documented immigrants
seek jobs, they encounter a market defined by this "race to the bottom"
among employers." Federal immigration policy in fact explicitly seeks to
one.").
5. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en
banc).
6. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 142.
7. Hoffman, 326 N.L.R.B. at 1060.
8. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
9. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a, 1324c (2000).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) ("Findings and declaration of policy").
11. E.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Employee Representation in the Boundaryless
Workplace, 77 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 773, 813 (2002) (describing "the well-known danger of
the race to the bottom .. "). As will be discussed more fully below, the AFL-CIO has
taken an increasingly significant stand in bringing this "race to the bottom" to the attention
of the American public and our elected officials:
U.S. employers have a long history of exploiting fear and differences to drive
wedges between workers. Today, they use the threat of exposing
undocumented workers and sending them back to their home country to force
them to work long hours, often in poor conditions and for poor wages.
But as history has shown, whenever one group of workers is denied access to
workplace protections, all workers' rights are in jeopardy. "Any action to deny
394
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enforce exemplary conditions in the workplace for all workers, as a
consequential goal of discouraging employment-based illegal
immigration. 12 The Supreme Court's rationale for reversing the Board's
Hoffman ruling, that the NLRB lacked the authority to interpret federal
immigration law, 13 misconstrued the Board's reasonable articulation of the
mandates of the NLRA in light of federal immigration policies. This
reversal was both a usurpation of the Board's authority and an act of
reinterpretation of immigration and labor laws amounting to judicial
legislation. Whereas the Board based its ruling largely on protection of
those public interests embodied in the NLRA and IRCA, the Supreme
Court majority ignored these fundamental principles and decided Hoffman
as if the case strictly implicated the private rights of an individual
employee.
In Part II of this comment, I will contrast the Supreme Court's holding
in Hoffman with the Board's decision in light of: (1) congressional intent in
the construction of immigration and labor policy; (2) prior Supreme Court
precedent; and (3) the application of that policy and precedent, both by the
benefits to any workers, whether they're immigrants, women, minorities or
white men, is a threat to all workers," says AFL-CIO Vice President and
UNITE International Vice President Clayola Brown. "Working people don't
have the luxury to be divided."
The plight of immigrants has a direct impact on all U.S. workers. Because
undocumented workers often are afraid to speak up for fear of being found out,
employers use them as a wedge to force down standards and pay throughout an
industry. If employers believe they can get away with treating immigrants
poorly, they will find ways to pit these workers against higher-paid, often union
workers, and try to force down the pay scale.
James B. Parks, Recognizing Our Common Bonds (2002), available at http://www.aflcio.org
/aboutaflcio/magazine/commonbonds.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2003).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46-49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5650-53 (explaining that the need for reform of immigration law has grown
significantly, both because of increasing numbers of undocumented workers seeking
employment in the United States and because of the practice of employers choosing to hire
them in order to avoid maintaining workplace conditions acceptable under federal
employment laws).
13. The Court held:
However broad the Board's discretion to fashion remedies when dealing only
with the NLRA, it is not so unbounded as to authorize this sort of an award.
... As we concluded in Sure-Tan, "in light of the practical workings of the
immigration laws," any "perceived deficienc[y] in the NLRA's existing
remedial arsenal" must be "addressed by congressional action," not the courts.
In light of IRCA, this statement is even truer today.
Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151-52 (2002) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883,904 (1984)).
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Board and the lower courts, prior to Hoffman. The priorities of both federal
immigration law and federal labor law, as expressly articulated in the
statutory provisions, require that the laws be interpreted so as to reinforce
one another. If either is interpreted otherwise, neither law succeeds as
intended: to protect the rights of individuals and the general public interest.
Undocumented immigration and labor abuses are joined so intimately that
to enforce one set of laws at the expense of the other compromises the
goals of both. The implications of Hoffman illustrate this point with
alarming clarity: while the Supreme Court's decision ostensibly denies a
private remedy to only one individual, the decision directly jeopardizes the
success of the public goals of both the NLRA and IRCA.
In Part III, I will articulate more comprehensively the potential
negative consequences of the Supreme Court's holding. The Supreme
Court's determination that undocumented immigrant employees are
ineligible for the full protections of the NLRA trivializes the definition of
"employee" because it establishes a precedent whereby groups may be
singled out for disparate treatment without technically disturbing this
definition in the NLRA 14 and other employment laws. 5 The NLRA draws
its strength from the universality of the definition of employee that legally
obligates all employers to maintain certain minimal standards (e.g.,
workplace conditions and fair wages). The Court's decision in Hoffman
gives employers room to evade the obligations of labor laws by preying on
undocumented immigrant workers' inability to demand enforcement of
their individual rights because of their status. Most alarmingly, the
decision effectively extinguishes the employment rights of undocumented
immigrant workers, perpetuating and creating new incentives for employers
to continue to break federal immigration law by hiring undocumented
immigrants and maintaining them as employees for as long as they can.16
The maintenance of such practices forces down the typical wage for all
workers and generally lowers standards for workplace conditions.
Moreover, an employer may increase its economic competitiveness by
employing undocumented workers, as compared to other employers who
do not take advantage of these workers. 7 The Supreme Court's decision in
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000).
15. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2000) (defining employee under the FLSA as "any
individual employed by an employer"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (defining "employee"
identically for purposes of equal employment opportunities).
16. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("May the employer ignore
the labor laws? More to the point, may the employer violate those laws with impunity, at
least once-secure in the knowledge that the Board cannot assess a monetary penalty?").
17. See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialetical
Model of White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 1041, 1053 (1990) ("A garment shop
owner, noting the competitive pressure to violate the employer sanction law, complained,
'When you have someone who's bidding against you and using illegals and paying them
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Hoffman thus invites the continued breaching of both federal immigration
and labor laws, yet the Court insists that its interpretation is correct and the
one intended by Congress.
In Part IV, I will consider how narrowly the lower courts have
applied, and continue to apply, the limitations suggested by Hoffman on
employment remedies for undocumented immigrant employees. Even
courts that have adopted the strictest interpretations of the precedent in this
area, up to and following Hoffman, have been reluctant to extend the
reasoning to cases involving other federal employment statutes, such as the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), s Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as administered by Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
(EEOC), 9 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 20 and various state
laws that extend similar protections to employees.2
Finally, in Part V, I will consider the need for Congress to define the
relationship between federal immigration and labor laws. I will argue that
in order to serve public and private interest goals appropriately, any policy
adopted must account for the significant contributions undocumented
immigrants already employed in the United States constantly make, in
addition to encouraging legal immigration and appropriate, legal employer
conduct.
II. DISTINGUISHING HOFFMAN BY THE BOARD FROM HOFFMAN BY THE
SUPREME COURT
In 1989, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. illegally fired Jose Castro
and several other employees for participating in union activities.22 When,
during the compliance phase of the adjudication in 1993 Mr. Castro
revealed that he was an undocumented immigrant, the Administrative Law
under the table, it's not really right."').
18. See Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704-06 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that
undocumented immigrants are entitled to the protections of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
219, and can recover unpaid back wages and liquidated damages).
19. See EEOC v. Tortilleria "La Mejor," 758 F. Supp. 585, 590 (E.D. Cal. 1991)
(holding "as a matter of law, that the protections of Title VII were intended by Congress to
run to aliens, whether documented or not, who are employed within the United States.").
20. Cf. Lopez v. Superflex, Ltd., No. 01 CIV. 10010(NRB), 2002 WL 1941484, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002) ("As the record does not reflect plaintiff's immigration status, we
cannot yet consider whether Hoffman Plastics applies to his [ADA] claim.").
21. See Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 100 (Pa.
2002) (holding that public policy does not exclude an unauthorized alien from receiving
relief under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act).
22. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1060 (1998); see also
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 100, 105-07 (1992) (finding that the
termination of employees was illegal).
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Judge denied him the standard remedy of reinstatement with back pay.23
The General Counsel of the NLRB filed an exception to the decision with
the Board. The Board granted Mr. Castro an award of limited back pay
without reinstatement. The Board adopted a balance in Hoffman similar to
those it had achieved in prior decisions: 24 serving the public policy goals of
both labor and immigration laws while responding to the tensions presented
by cases involving undocumented-immigrant employees. In its balancing,
the Board acknowledged the importance of reconciling immigration
policies with the private rights guaranteed to all employees under federal
employment laws. It adopted the presumption embraced by a majority of
the lower courts: that Congress intentionally crafted immigration and labor
laws to reinforce, in a mutual way, the protections of public rights.25
A. IRCA and NLRA Mutually Reinforce Concordant Policy Goals
Congress introduced IRCA, the immigration law central to Hoffman,
26in 1986. This legislation for the first time criminalized the knowing
employment of undocumented immigrants and established guidelines for
employers regarding document verification for all employees upon hiring.27
As discussed in a House Committee Report issued at the time of the
passage of IRCA, Congress' intent was to discourage illegal immigration to
the United States, but not to discourage employment-based immigration to
the United States in general:
This legislation seeks to close the back door on illegal
immigration so that the front door on legal immigration may
remain open. The principal means of closing the back door, or
curtailing future illegal immigration, is through employer
sanctions. The bill would prohibit the employment of aliens who
are unauthorized to work in the United States because they either
entered the country illegally, or are in an immigration status
which does not permit employment. U.S. employers who violate
this prohibition would be subject to civil and criminal penalties.
Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally or, in
the case of nonimmigrants, leads them to accept employment in
violation of their status. Employers will be deterred by the
penalties in this legislation from hiring unauthorized aliens and
23. See Hoffman, 326 N.L.R.B. at 1064-65.
24. See, e.g., A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408,414-16 (1995).
25. See, e.g., Perales v. Reno, 48 F.3d 1305, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the
amnesty provisions of IRCA); EEOC v. Tortilleria "La Mejor," 758 F. Supp. 585, 590-94
(E.D. Cal. 1991) (discussing the impact of IRCA on Title VII).
26. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (codified, as amended, in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
27. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a)(1), 1324a(b)(1)(B) (2000).
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this, in turn, will deter aliens from entering illegally or violating
28their status in search of employment.
Congress has acknowledged that, due to unfavorable conditions in
their countries of origin, many aliens desperately seek employment without
going through the process of becoming documented. As such, Congress
placed significant responsibility on the employers to prevent jobs from
29being held by undocumented workers. Moreover, the report recognized
the challenges faced by undocumented immigrants, once they are employed
here, in seeking redress where their employment rights have been
transgressed, due to their fear of being deported. This inability to demand
the protection of employment rights has negative repercussions for all
workers because it encourages employers to hire undocumented
immigrants so as not to be held accountable for offering legitimate wages
and acceptable workplace conditions. The report articulates this principle
tellingly:
In particular, the employer sanctions provisions are not intened
[sic] to limit in any way the scope of the term "employee" in
Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as
amended, or of the rights and protections stated in Sections 7 and
8 of that Act. As the Supreme Court observed.., application of
the NLRA "helps to assure that the wages and employment
conditions of lawful residents are not adversely affected by the
competition of illegal alien employees who are not subject to the
standard terms of employment." 0
Congress emphasized employer sanctions in IRCA because it
recognized that undocumented immigration creates significant problems for
all employees and, therefore, for the public in general. The existence of a
large pool of undocumented workers allows employers to hire individuals
who are unable to challenge dangerous workplace conditions and
subminimum wages. Furthermore, Congress addressed individual
examples of these practices at the time of the passage of IRCA, indicating
its contextualized awareness of the importance of protecting the rights of
28. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5650 (emphasis added).
29. The House Committee on the Judiciary noted:
Now, as in the past, the Committee remains convinced that legislation
containing employer sanctions is the most humane, credible and effective way
to respond to the large-scale influx of undocumented aliens. While there is no
doubt that many who enter illegally do so for the best of motives-to seek a
better life for themselves and their families-immigration must proceed in a
legal, orderly and regulated fashion.
H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5650.
30. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5662 (quoting
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893 (1984)).
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undocumented workers as employees because of their interdependence with
all other workers in the United States.3'
Along with its focus on controlling illegal immigration in order to
benefit all employees, Congress also acknowledged the contributions that
undocumented immigrant workers have made, and continue to make, to the
United States and its workforce. To address both concerns most
effectively, Congress added temporary amnesty provisions to IRCA
32
offering permanent residence to those undocumented immigrants who
could demonstrate their continuous residency in the United States since
1982 and a continuing ability to support themselves here:
The Committee believes that the solution lies in legalizing the
status of aliens who have been present in the United States for
several years, recognizing that past failures to enforces [sic] the
immigration laws have allowed them to enter and to settle here.
This step would enable INS to target its enforcement efforts on
new flows of undocumented aliens and, in conjunction with the
proposed employer sanctions programs, help stem the flow of
undocumented people to the United States. It would allow
qualified aliens to contribute openly to society and it would help
to prevent the exploitation of this vulnerable population in the
work place.33
Congress thus created a system for reducing illegal immigration to the
United States while keeping our country open to embrace new immigrant
workers. In passing IRCA, Congress adopted the principle that the best
interests of the country as a whole would be served by encouraging the
influx of motivated workers into our economy where the economy can
support them, while requiring employers to maintain the high level of
workplace standards demanded by federal labor laws.
The House Committee Report cited above had influenced the lower
courts and the Board in those decisions prior to Hoffman that involved both
31. This interdependence was addressed in testimony before the House Immigration
Subcommittee:
The NAACP strongly supports employer sanctions. Our branches across the
country, particularly in large cities, report that the undocumented worker
impacts the employment of blacks. Many blacks are forced from employment
rolls by the undocumented worker who is hired at a subminimum wage and is at
the mercy of the employer. The worker is consciously aware that he/she has no
protection because of illegal status and will accept "starvation" wages to be
employed in the United States.
H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 47, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5651 (testimony of
Althea Simmons, Director of the Washington Bureau of the NAACP).
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (2000); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 72-74, reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5676-78.
33. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5653.
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the NLRA and IRCA. Although commentators continue to debate the
validity of relying on legislative history as an indication of congressional
intent,34 the amnesty provisions in IRCA, the statutory language actually
adopted, and the lower courts' interpretations of the statute suggest that, in
this case, the report adequately reflected Congress' understanding of the
significance of the legislation. Indeed, the dissenting justices in Hoffman
based their objections largely on this House Committee Report. The
dissent argued that, in this report, Congress had articulated its intent that
federal labor and immigration law should be read as mutually reinforcing
so that the goals and policies of the one always accord with those of the
other." In fact, Congress could not have stated these intentions more
clearly:
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer
sanctions provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish
in any way labor protections in existing law, or to limit the
powers of federal or state labor relations boards, labor standards
agencies, or labor arbitrators to remedy unfair practices
committed against undocumented employees for exercising their
rights before such agencies or for engaging in activities protected
by existing law.36
However, the Supreme Court's decision ultimately ignored these public
interest goals and refused to apply immigration and labor laws in a
mutually supportive way.
B. The Board's Remedy in Hoffman Reinforced Both Congressional
Immigration and Labor Policy Goals
In fashioning its remedy for Jose Castro in Hoffman, the Board
reasoned that Congress' motives in its criminalization of employment of
undocumented immigrants were jointly to discourage continued
undocumented immigration and to promote appropriate standards in the
workplace among all employers. The Board explicitly articulated in its
decision that its remedy of limited back pay to Mr. Castro served these dual
goals and was therefore entirely in accordance with immigration policy.37
34. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673, 699, 715-18 (1997) (asserting that courts should not rely on legislative history to
interpret unclear statutory language); cf Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History
in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 857-59 (1992) (arguing that courts can
legitimately use legislative history to choose between reasonable interpretations of
politically controversial statutes).
35. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 155-56 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
36. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5662.
37. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1060 (1998) ("[T]he
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The Board relied significantly on the fact that IRCA does not expressly
forbid remedies of back pay38 and also on a reading of the Supreme Court's
holding in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,3 9 the precedent-setting decision prior to
Hoffman.
In Sure-Tan, the Court was asked to decide whether undocumented
immigrants, who had fled the country in response to their employer's
unlawfully reporting their status to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) because of their union activities, should be eligible to collect
back pay. Congress had not yet passed IRCA so it was not yet illegal for
an employer to hire undocumented workers. The Court held that the
undocumented workers could not collect back pay for any periods of time
when they would have been deemed "unavailable" to work because they
were unable to be legally present in the United States.4°
In applying the Sure-Tan decision to Mr. Castro's situation, the Board
adopted an interpretation that it and several of the circuit courts 4' had
embraced since the passage of IRCA in 1986: immigrants who had fled the
country could not collect their back pay because they were unable to
reenter as eligible workers, not having gone through the processes
most effective way to accommodate and further the immigration policies embedded in the
Immigration and Reform Act of 1986 is to provide the protections of the National Labor
Relation Act (NLRA) to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other
employees....").
38. Id. at 1061-62 (following Board precedent in rejecting argument by employer that
IRCA precludes back pay remedy); A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B.
408, 414 (1995) ("[T]he House Report explicitly disclaims any limitation on the power to
remedy employers' avoidance of workplace protections.").
39. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
40. The Court reasoned:
By conditioning the offers of reinstatement on the employees' legal reentry, a
potential conflict with the INA is thus avoided. Similarly, in computing
backpay, the employees must be deemed "unavailable" for work (and the
accrual of backpay therefore tolled) during any period when they were not
lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States.
Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 903 (citation omitted).
41. See NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1997)
(interpreting Sure-Tan "as addressing only awards of backpay to undocumented employees
who have left the country, and held that, when undocumented employees remain in the
United States after their illegal termination, backpay may appropriately be awarded .... );
see also Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Cudahy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Sure-Tan decision only applies to undocumented
employees who are not in the country); Local 512, Warehouse and Office Workers' Union
v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 722 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Sure-Tan barred from backpay only those
undocumented workers who were... outside the United States without entry papers.");
EEOC v. Tortilleria "La Mejor," 758 F. Supp. 585, 591 (E.D. Ca. 1991) (quoting with favor
the Ninth Circuit's holding in Local 512). But see Del Rey Tortilleria, 976 F.2d. at 1120
(adopting broad interpretation of Sure-Tan).
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necessary for legal immigration.42 The Board limited Castro's award to
back pay only up to the point at which his employer learned of his illegal
status, without reinstatement.43 Finding no evidence that Hoffman Plastic
Compounds had hired Castro knowing he was an illegal immigrant, the
Board appropriately tailored its decision to punish the employer for its
violations of the NLRA.
The Board's reasoning in Hoffman represents the policy it had adopted
in the years between Sure-Tan and the passage of IRCA. In fact, the Board
adapted for Hoffman the remedy it had provided in A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil
Buyers Group, Inc.,44 in which the employer had knowingly hired two
undocumented immigrants whom it then fired unlawfully for union
activities, after committing several other flagrant abuses of the NLRA.45
Finding that the employer would have continued to employ the two
undocumented immigrants had it not been for their union activities,46 the
Board articulated a remedy consistent with its policy of balancing the
mandates of the NLRA, to enforce public rights through the protection of
individualized assertions of these rights,47 with the mandates of IRCA. The
Board demonstrated its full understanding of Congress' intent as to how
these bodies of law should be read together:
After carefully considering the briefs and reviewing the record,
we find that IRCA and the NLRA can and must be read in
42. Hoffrnan, 326 N.L.R.B. at 1062.
43. Id.
44. 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995).
45. Id. at 408-09.
46. Id.
47. As the Court has described the Board's function:
The Board acts in a public capacity to give effect to the declared public policy
of the Act to eliminate and prevent obstructions to interstate commerce by
encouraging collective bargaining and by protecting the "exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives
of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of their employment .. " § 1. The immediate object of the proceeding is to
prevent unfair labor practices which, as defined by §§ 7, 8, are practices tending
to thwart the declared policy of the Act....
Here the right asserted by the Board is not one arising upon or derived from the
contracts between petitioner and its employees. The Board asserts a public right
vested in it as a public body, charged in the public interest with the duty of
preventing unfair labor practices. The public right and the duty extend not only
to the prevention of unfair labor practices by the employer in the future, but to
the prevention of his enjoyment of any advantage which he has gained by
violation of the Act, whether it be a company union or an unlawful contract
with employees, as the means of defeating the statutory policy and purpose.
Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB. 309 U.S. 350, 362-64 (1940).
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harmony as complementary elements of a legislative scheme
explicitly intended, in both cases, to protect the rights of
employees in the American workplace. We reject the
Respondent's reading of IRCA as requiring the Board to deny its
traditional make-whole remedies to unlawfully discharged
employees because they have not provided documents necessary
for legal employment in the United States .... We shall order the
Respondent to offer reinstatement to Benavides and Guzman;
however, we condition the Respondent's obligation to reinstate
these individuals on the individuals' production, within a
reasonable time, of documents enabling the Respondent to meet
its obligation under IRCA to verify their eligibility for
employment in the United States. Backpay shall be tolled as of
the date the discriminatees are reinstated or when, after a
reasonable period of time, they are unable to produce the
documents enabling the Respondent to meet its obligations under
IRCA to verify their eligibility for employment in the United
States.48
As the Board states explicitly, the remedy punishes the employer and
discourages future labor violations, thus serving the goals of the NLRA,
while requiring the employees to obtain documented status in order to
collect their awards. This serves IRCA's goal of discouraging immigrants
from seeking employment outside legal channels, while accepting that
immigrant workers make constant positive contributions to our workforce
and supporting them in these efforts. In other words, the award protects the
public interests, as intended by Congress in fashioning both immigration
and labor laws, while providing an appropriate remedy for the individual
in question.49
In fashioning its award in Hoffman, the Board took into account that
Castro had obtained employment through the use of fraudulent documents
and, at the time of the hearing, still had undocumented status and therefore
was technically unavailable for reinstatement. 50 Nevertheless, Hoffman
Plastic Compounds had not been aware of this when it hired Castro and
then proceeded to commit labor abuses against him and his fellow
employees. The Board, therefore, determined that the appropriate remedy
was back pay up until the point at which Castro's employer learned of his
undocumented status because only after that point could it present a
48. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil, 320 N.L.R.B. at 408 (emphasis added).
49. See NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1997)
(upholding the Board's decision to grant the illegal immigrant employees back pay with
reinstatement on the condition that the back pay would be tolled either when the employer
re-hired them legally or after they failed to acquire the documentation required by IRCA
within a reasonable time).
50. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1060-61 (1998).
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defense that it did not create, and knowingly maintain, an employment
relationship with an undocumented immigrant.
At the individual level, the Board's economic sanctions on the
employer serve to discourage future labor violations against particular
employees. Acknowledging that Mr. Castro, the employee in this case, was
not in compliance with federal immigration policies, the Board recognized
the employer's defense that it should not be liable for providing
compensation to Castro from the point at which it realized he was
unavailable for employment. The rationale behind the defense is that, from
this point forward, the employer had a legitimate reason for dismissing Mr.
Castro." An employer can offer a comparable defense against the back pay
claims of any employee in light of circumstances that give the employer an
acceptable reason for dismissing an employee; therefore, the defense does
not have the effect of distinguishing undocumented immigrant employees
from other employees. Such a remedy recognizes that while employed,
Mr. Castro was an employee like any other, as IRCA does not criminalize
the actual work completed by an undocumented worker.5 2
The award serves the public interest by discouraging future labor
violations while simultaneously reducing an employer's incentive to hire
undocumented immigrants. If the rights of undocumented workers are
enforceable, then there is no advantage to hiring them that would
compensate for the disadvantage of having to break federal immigration
law in the process. This thereby reduces the number of jobs available to
undocumented immigrants and, in the long run, may discourage them from
coming to the United States. At both levels, the award brings the mandates
of federal labor law into accordance with those of federal immigration law.
C. The Supreme Court Rejected a Reconciliation of IRCA and the NLRA
In its affirmance of the Board's ruling in Hoffman, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit fully embraced the Board's rationale for its
award to Mr. Castro.53 Just as importantly, in terms of setting judicial
51. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215-16 n.9 (1964)
(quoting § 10(c) of the NLRA for the proposition that the Board cannot award back pay
where the employee was discharged for cause).
52. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 639, 649 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (en banc) ("IRCA does not explicitly make it unlawful for undocumented aliens to
work.").
53. The D.C. Circuit stated:
Expressly considering the policies of both IRCA and the NLRA, the Board
agreed with the ALJ that reinstatement of an undocumented discriminatee
would be inappropriate. As the Board had explained in an earlier case, ordering
reinstatement would force an employer to violate IRCA's prohibition against
knowingly hiring undocumented aliens. The Board disagreed with the ALJ that
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precedent, the D.C. Circuit specifically confirmed the Board's reading of
Sure-Tan and identified the decisions of other circuits that had embraced
the same reading.54 In particular, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the public
interests served by reconciling the tensions between immigration and labor
laws and articulated how the Board achieved this with its individualized
award in Hoffman:
The Board crafted the limited backpay remedy to avoid conflict
with IRCA and to implement its understanding of the purposes of
both IRCA and the NLRA. According to the Board, the limited
backpay award reduces employer incentives to prefer
undocumented workers (IRCA's goal), reinforces collective
bargaining rights for all workers (the NLRA's goal), and protects
wages and working conditions for authorized workers (the goal
of both Acts). Far from "ignor[ing] other and equally important
Congressional objectives," the Board, fully enforcing its own
statute, carefully considered IRCA and modified its traditional
backpay remedy accordingly.5
As viewed by the D.C. Circuit, the Board had successfully crafted a
remedy that facilitated the protection of public interests by the labor and
immigration statutes while fully accounting for the details of the dispute
between Mr. Castro and Hoffman Plastic Compounds.
The Supreme Court majority, however, directly refused to construe
congressional intent in the way adopted by the Board and the D.C. Circuit
that largely provided the rationale for the Board's award in Hoffman. In
fact, the Court majority took an entirely different view, reading
congressional intent as prioritizing the prevention of illegal immigration
over the enforcement of federal labor laws. The Court further stated that
the Board had overstepped its authority as an agency by even attempting to
resolve tensions between labor and immigration policies in its decision.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that any remedy that offered individual
relief to Mr. Castro was precluded, if not under Sure-Tan, then certainly
under IRCA. The Court emphasized that Congress had prioritized the
promulgation of IRCA over the Board's awarding an individual remedy for
labor violations:
[A]llowing the Board to award backpay to illegal aliens would
unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to
IRCA prevented any award of backpay. To account for IRCA's prohibition on
the fraudulent use of documents, however, the Board applied its well-
established after-acquired evidence rule and ended backpay liability the moment
Hoffman became aware of Castro's undocumented status.
Id. at 641 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 645 (citing cases from the Second and Ninth Circuits).
55. Id. at 650 (internal citation omitted).
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federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA. It would
encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration
authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and
encourage future violations. However broad the Board's
discretion to fashion remedies when dealing only with the
NLRA, it is not so unbounded as to authorize this sort of an
award. 56
The Court argued that Sure-Tan and related precedents in many ways
provided only an historical backdrop for the decision in this case, given that
Sure-Tan was issued prior to IRCA.57  Although the majority
acknowledged that undocumented immigrants are employees fully
58protected by federal labor laws, it held that they are not entitled to the
same remedies as other employees because they had not experienced the
same legal losses for which reinstatement and back pay serve to
compensate, since they never had the right to employment in the first
place.59  The Supreme Court further reasoned that the fact that
undocumented immigrants are never eligible for employment in the United
States has two legally significant implications: (1) in order to create the
employment relationship, either the immigrant or the employer or both
must have committed a fraudulent act;60 (2) following the unlawful
dismissal, the undocumented immigrant would not be able to seek any
other employment opportunities without committing further fraudulent
acts, and this failure to mitigate damages would preclude the employee
from being eligible to receive the remedies prescribed by the Act.6'
In holding that Mr. Castro's fraudulent actions in obtaining
employment should preclude him from receiving any back pay, the
majority rejected the determinations of the Board and the D.C. Circuit that
the case law, based on efforts to enforce both the NLRA and IRCA,
62supports the opposite presumption. Among its other roles, an award of
56. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151-52 (2002).
57. Id. at 147.
58. Id. at 144-45.
59. Id. at 146.
60. Id. at 148.
61. Id. at 150-51.
62. In finding that the case law did not preclude Mr. Castro from receiving back pay,
the D.C. Circuit stated:
Even where, as here, the discriminatee violates the law, the Supreme Court has
refused to require the Board to deny all backpay. In ABF Freight System, Inc. v.
NLRB, 510 U.S. 317 (1994), the discriminatee perjured himself during the
compliance proceeding-an act which, like Castro's fraudulent conduct,
violated federal criminal law. Although declaring that "[flalse testimony in a
formal proceeding is intolerable," and that "perjury should be severely
sanctioned," the Court rejected the company's argument that such behavior
should preclude the employee from receiving backpay: "[The company's]
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back pay attests to the legitimacy of the employment relationship that had
existed. In holding that all undocumented immigrants should be precluded
from receiving awards of back pay, the majority contradicted its own
statement that undocumented immigrant workers are fully employees under
federal labor laws. 3  Equally strikingly, the Court stated that the Board
should have limited its resolution of the case to assigning prospective
remedies against the employer, for example, requiring the employer to post
signs attesting that it had committed labor violations. The majority held
that federal immigration policy prevented the Board from offering any of
the traditional remedies to undocumented immigrant employees as a class,
regardless of the labor violations committed by the employer as against a
particular employee. The majority justified this holding by asserting that
Congress intended to prioritize the enforcement of immigration laws and
asserted that, "[a]s we concluded in Sure-Tan, 'in light of the practical
workings of the immigration laws,' any 'perceived deficienc[y] in the
NLRA's existing remedial arsenal,' must be 'addressed by congressional
action,' not the courts. In light of IRCA, this statement is even truer
today."64  The majority effectively made undocumented immigrants a
discrete class of employees, and acquiesced to their disparate treatment by
employers.
D. Pitfalls that Hoffman Has Created for the Enforcement of Labor and
Immigration Policies
Opening his dissent with the following statement, Justice Breyer
challenged the entire basis of the majority's decision:
I cannot agree that the backpay award before us "runs counter
to," or "trenches upon," national immigration policy. As all the
relevant agencies (including the Department of Justice) have told
us, the National Labor Relations Board's limited backpay order
will not interfere with the implementation of immigration policy.
contention, though not inconsistent with our appraisal of [the employee's]
misconduct, raises countervailing concerns. Most important is Congress'
decision to delegate to the Board the primary responsibility for making
remedial decisions that best effectuate the policies of the Act when it has
substantiated an unfair labor practice."
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 639, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.3d
229, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (reasoning that, because Mr. Castro was hired in 1988, prior to
the 1990 amendments to IRCA, "Castro's use of another's birth certificate to obtain
employment did not violate IRCA at that time."), aff'd en banc, 237 F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
63. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 144-45.
64. Id. at 151-52 (citations omitted).
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Rather, it reasonably helps to deter unlawful activity that both
labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent. Consequently,
the order is lawful.
65
He plainly asserted that the majority had misinterpreted the statutory
66
language of IRCA and the intent of Congress in crafting IRCA, ignored
the federal mandates of the NLRA and entirely stripped the Board of its
statutory authority to enforce the NLRA effectively, 67 and issued a decision
that ultimately will undermine both federal immigration and employment
laws:
To deny the Board the power to award backpay, however, might
very well increase the strength of this magnetic force. That denial
lowers the cost to the employer of an initial labor law violation
(provided, of course, that the only victims are illegal aliens). It




The Supreme Court's majority refused to look beyond Mr. Castro's
individual identity, as a member of the class of undocumented immigrants,
to address the public rights that the Board's decision sought to protect
through granting Mr. Castro a private remedy. The majority's decision
rests entirely on its rejection of the view adopted overwhelmingly by the
lower courts: that Congress' intent in passing IRCA was expressed in the
House Committee Report. This rejection runs contrary to the position
adopted extensively throughout the related case law and articulated so
65. Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 154-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67. In considering the Board's limited authority, Justice Breyer stated:
Without the possibility of the deterrence that backpay provides, the Board can
impose only future-oriented obligations upon law-violating employers-for it
has no other weapons in its remedial arsenal. And in the absence of the backpay
weapon, employers could conclude that they can violate the labor laws at least
once with impunity.
Id. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers
Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 415, n.38 (1995) (without potential back pay order employer
might simply discharge employees who show interest in a union "secure in the knowledge"
that the only penalties were requirements "to cease and desist and post a notice"); cf EEOC
v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 n. 11(2002) (back pay award provides important
incentive to report illegal employer conduct); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
417-18 (1975) ("It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award" that leads
employers to "shun practices of dubious legality"); Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414
U.S. 168, 186-87 (1973) ("[Ilt cannot be in the public interest to permit the violator of the
Act to shed all responsibility for remedying his own unfair labor practices by simply
disposing of the business."). Hence the back pay remedy is necessary; it helps make labor
law enforcement credible and also makes clear that violating the labor laws will not pay.
See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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richly in Justice Breyer's dissent. As demonstrated above, Breyer
explained that only the mutual enforcement of labor and immigration laws
can protect the public interests implicated by either.
By focusing entirely on preventing undocumented immigration by
imposing sanctions at the individual level, the majority's decision flies in
the face of Congress' articulated intent that immigration and employment
laws be read as seamlessly as possible. The majority erroneously viewed
federal immigration policy as completely preemptive of federal labor
policy for individual cases and interpreted the law with this focus:
There is no reason to think that Congress nonetheless intended to
permit backpay where but for an employer's unfair labor
practices, an alien-employee would have remained in the United
States illegally, and continued to work illegally, all the while
successfully evading apprehension by immigration authorities.
Far from "accommodating" IRCA, the Board's position,
recognizing employer misconduct but discounting the
misconduct of illegal alien employees, subverts it.
69
Where the majority identified any public interest implicated by this
particular case at all, it limited it to preventing further illegal immigration70
The majority only vaguely acknowledged the public interests generally
protected by the NLRA and federal labor laws when it asserted that the
prospective remedies forced upon Hoffman Plastic Compounds-of
declaring officially their labor violations-would discourage this behavior
in the future sufficiently.72 However, as Justice Breyer clearly articulated,
the prospective remedies will not discourage future labor violations,
particularly not as against undocumented immigrant employees. In fact
they will encourage employers to hire more undocumented immigrant
workers because these individuals will not benefit from the full protections
of federal labor laws, at least not the NLRA. Employers will be cushioned
69. Id. at 149-50.
70. Id. at 150.
71. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 100, 101 (1992) (reprinting notice
that employer was required to post).
72. In support of its view that employers will be discouraged from hiring undocumented
workers, the Court states:
Lack of authority to award backpay does not mean that the employer gets off
scot-free. The Board here has already imposed other significant sanctions
against Hoffman-sanctions Hoffman does not challenge.... These include
orders that Hoffman cease and desist its violations of the NLRA, and that it
conspicuously post a notice to employees setting forth their rights under the
NLRA and detailing its prior unfair practices. Hoffman will be subject to
contempt proceedings should it fail to comply with these orders. We have
deemed such "traditional remedies" sufficient to effectuate national labor policy
regardless of whether the "spur and catalyst" of backpay accompanies them.
Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152 (citations omitted).
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from the full force of federal labor laws when they employ undocumented
workers, and this may be worth it to many employers financially-for as
long as they can evade federal immigration restrictions.
The Court implied in Hoffman that the ideal resolution to any conflict
between federal labor and immigration laws simply should be to exclude all
undocumented immigrants from protections reserved only for those
individuals who have obtained their employment in the United States
legitimately. Such a sweeping policy seems grossly unfair and raises
constitutional concerns.73 Yet even putting aside all such arguments, the
Court's approach, were it applied generally, would have potentially
devastating repercussions for our overall system of labor relations.
III. THREATS PRESENTED BY THE DECISION
As the NLRA refuses to distinguish among employees on the basis of
citizenship status, the Court's Hoffman decision creates difficulty from
both constitutional and pragmatic standpoints. It seems to require that the
Board discriminatorily enforce federal law against individuals who are
protected comparably to citizens under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.74 Moreover, if we acknowledge that Congress intended to
advance the public interests through the reconciled enforcement of
immigration and labor laws, the Court unnecessarily and improperly
transgressed the Board's discretion when it overruled Hoffman. The Board
crafted a remedy that most effectively balanced the priorities of the NLRA
with the overall body of relevant federal law. The Court should have
afforded the Board's reasonable interpretation and application of the NLRA
significant, if not complete, deference based on its own precedent regarding
73. Over a century ago the Supreme Court, in construing the scope of constitutional
protections for non-citizens, established that:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection
of citizens. It says: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." These provisions are universal in
their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard
to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of
the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). More recently, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that:
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States.
The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every
one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful,
involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (citations omitted).
74. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77-78.
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agency decisions. 5 Instead, the majority attempted to avoid all questions
of deference to the Board as an agency by characterizing the Board's
decision as an interpretation of federal immigration law, entirely beyond
the scope of its authority.76
The Court's majority decision, in contrast to the Board's reasoned
balancing, threatens to jeopardize the effective promulgation of both labor
and immigration laws. The decision prevents the enforcement of the most
effective penalties of the NLRA against employers who commit labor
violations against their undocumented immigrant employees, whereas
IRCA itself nowhere precludes the full enforcement of the NLRA. Justice
Breyer identified how the majority's decision fails to satisfy, and indeed
compromises, the priorities embodied in both strands of federal law.77 As it
75. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(establishing a presumption of near-complete deference to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutory meaning). Since then, the Court has qualified this presumption of near-
complete deference to extend to agency decisions where: (1) Congress has given an agency
the power to act with the force of law; and (2) the interpretation in question was made
pursuant to that authority. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
Commentators suggest that the Court intended the discretion to extend only to decisions that
result in binding and self-executing orders. They continue to debate whether Chevron
deference extends to NLRB decisions, given that parties must seek enforcement of their
orders and injunctions from appellate courts. E.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 883 (2001). Even if the Court could have
adopted the position that NLRB decisions did not warrant Chevron deference, the case law
prior to Chevron suggests that courts should grant NLRB decisions significant deference.
See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) (holding that "[t]he
Board's power is a broad discretionary one, subject to limited judicial review .... The
Board's order will not be disturbed 'unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt
to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the
Act."'); see also Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 621 (1966) (expressing the
view that, "[bly giving the agency discretionary power to fashion remedies, Congress places
a premium upon agency expertise, and, for the sake of uniformity, it is usually better to
minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substitute their discretion for that of the
agency."). Finally, the rationale the Court adopted in Mead counsels that the Court should
have deferred to the Board's decision in this case. Mead asserted that where agency
decisions might not rise to the level of Chevron deference, courts should still grant their
decisions significant deference: "Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that
an agency's interpretation may merit some deference ... given the 'specialized experience
and broader investigations and information' available to the agency. . . and given the value
of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law
requires." Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40
(1944)).
76. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 144-45 (referring to past cases that exclude the NLRB
from ruling on federal bankruptcy and antitrust law). But see id. at 157 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the Court's prior deference to Board decisions, even in cases where
the decisions had implications for the enforcement of criminal law).
77. Justice Breyer aptly points out that:
[T]he statutes' language itself does not explicitly state how a violation is to
effect the enforcement of other laws, such as the labor laws. What is to happen,
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stands, the majority's decision likely gives employers greater incentives to
break federal immigration laws and employ more undocumented
immigrants than they would have, were they liable for at least limited back
pay. This creates harmful competition among employers-who will be
willing to disregard federal law in order to employ workers whose rights
78
under the NLRA are unenforceable. It also widens the job market within
the United States for illegal immigrants. Finally, the decision increases
undocumented immigrants' lack of security in their rights and ensures that
they will not seek to have courts redress violations of those rights.79 The
decision thus directly impedes the express goals of both Congress'
immigration and labor policies.8°
Shortly after Hoffman, the General Counsel of the NLRB issued a
memorandum, suggesting how the Board should approach future cases
involving undocumented immigrants.8 Reaffirming that undocumented
82
immigrants are employees, fully protected under the NLRA, the General
Counsel emphasized that the immigration status of employees is irrelevant
for determining whether particular employers have committed labor
for example, when an employer hires, or an alien works, in violation of these
provisions? Must the alien forfeit all pay earned? May the employer ignore the
labor laws? More to the point, may the employer violate those laws with
impunity, at least once-secure in the knowledge that the Board cannot assess a
monetary penalty? The immigration statutes' language simply does not say.
Id. at 154-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78. See Calavita, supra note 17, at 1053.
79. Discussion in the legal community has extended to seeking protected class status for
undocumented immigrants:
Although undocumented workers are afforded the same substantive rights as
documented employees, the ability of undocumented workers to enforce those
rights is limited by the fear of deportation and the fact that remedies are either
limited or nonexistent. Undocumented workers face a "Catch-22" when
deciding whether to remain silent and subject themselves to exploitation or
assert their rights and subject themselves to deportation. Society's "perception
of immigrants as a labor source rather than as future members of... society
creates a marginalized subclass of the general population." This view creates a
class vulnerable to exploitation by employers looking solely at the bottom line.
The result warrants the grant of "protected class" status to undocumented
workers.
Irene Zopoth Hudson & Susan Schenck, Comment, America: Land of Opportunity or
Exploitation?, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 351, 369 (2002) (citations omitted).
80. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. Memorandum from General Counsel Arthur F. Rosenfeld, to All Regional Directors
of the NLRB, Officers-In-Charge and Resident Officers, GC 02-06, Procedures and
Remedies for Discriminatees Who May Be Undocumented Aliens after Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc., at 2002 WL 1730518 (N.L.R.B.G.C.) (July 19, 2002) [hereinafter GC
Memorandum] at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared-files/gcmemo/gcmemo/gcO2-06.asp (last
visited Nov. 10, 2003).
82. Id. at*l (§ B1).
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violations against them.83 Therefore, questions of immigration status must
only be considered in the compliance phase of any adjudication. s4 The
memo asserts that Hoffman does not foreclose awards in non-discharge
situations for work already performed or in cases where benefits or wages
85have been changed illegally. It further states that the Board should
continue to order reinstatement and back pay, conditioned upon the
86employee's obtaining legal status. Additionally, the General Counsel
advised that the Board should only entertain discovery regarding an
employee's status where the employer specifically seeks to have the matter
addressed.87
The General Counsel did limit the availability of reinstatement to
cases in which the employer could not demonstrate (as the employer in this
case, Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc., did succeed in demonstrating) that
it would not have knowingly have hired an undocumented immigrant.88 In
the same vein, the General Counsel advised that, based on the holding in
Hoffman, "[r]egions should not seek a backpay remedy once evidence
establishes that a discriminatee was not authorized to work during the
backpay period., 89 Based on this, some commentators have focused on the
unavailability of back pay and suggested that the Board has adopted the
broadest interpretation of Hoffman, threatening to institutionalize this
reading to the detriment of undocumented workers and the system of law
under the NLRA.90 Nevertheless, the emphasis the General Counsel placed
on sustaining the maximum availability of remedies and protecting
undocumented workers rights as employees belies the suggestion that the
Board has adopted the Supreme Court's interpretation of the relationship
between IRCA and the NLRA.9' Instead the General Counsel seems to
have intended that the memorandum caution the Regional Board members
that courts may attempt to construe Hoffman broadly, and to suggest
policies the Board may adopt to avoid having decisions overturned on
83. Id. (§ B2).
84. Id.
85. Id. at *3 (§ C2).
86. Id. at *2 (§§ B4, CI).
87. Id. at *4 (§ E).
88. Id. at *2 (§ B4).
89. Id. (§ C1).
90. See, e.g., Dennise A. Calderon-Barrera, Hoffman v. NLRB: Leaving Undocumented
Workers Unprotected Under United States Labor Laws? 6 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 119, 141-
43 (2003); Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable
Workers?, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 103, 136 (2003).
91. See GC Memorandum, supra note 81, at *1 (§ BI) ("[I]t is unassailable that all
statutory employees, including undocumented workers, enjoy protections from unfair labor
practices and the right to vote in NLRB elections without regard to their immigration
status."); id. (§ B2) ("The Court in Hoffman dealt only with a remedial question, and thus, as
set forth above, does not overturn otherwise settled Board and Court law.").
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appeal based on an employer's use of Hoffman.92 Other commentators
have suggested a reading of the memorandum compatible with this
analysis. 93
Similarly, the AFL-CIO, which already had taken a highly active role
in advocating for the rights of immigrant workers, has stepped up its efforts
to call public attention to the interconnections between the welfare of these
individuals and the general public. The organization has asserted that, in
an effort to enforce public policies that provide for the rights of all workers,
it "supports a broad legalization program that makes no distinction based
on country of origin and that allows undocumented workers and their
families who have been working hard, paying taxes[,] and contributing to
their communities the opportunity to adjust to permanent legal resident
status. ' 94
92. The General Counsel explicitly identified how the Board may act within the scope
of its authority to minimize Hoffrnan's destruction of remedies for undocumented
employees, noting that the burden remains on the employer to prove the relevance of an
employee's immigration status and not before the compliance and settlement stages:
The Hoffman decision clearly established that an employee's immigration status
may become a relevant factor during the compliance and settlement phases.
Proof of a discriminatee's undocumented status, as with any other defense to
reinstatement or backpay, must be established through evidence proffered by
the party making the allegation, and not through a sua sponte regional
investigation. The Hoffman decision does not shift the burden onto the Board to
conduct an immigration investigation in the first instance. In fact, this issue
arose in Hoffman not pursuant to an investigation, but because the discriminatee
admitted on the witness stand during a compliance hearing that he was
undocumented throughout the backpay period.
Regions have no obligation to investigate an employee's immigration status
unless a respondent affirmatively establishes the existence of a substantial
immigration issue. Regions should begin their analysis with the presumption
that employees and employers alike have conformed to the law. The law-
IRCA-protects employees against harassment by an employer which seeks to
reverify their immigration status without cause. A substantial immigration issue
is lodged when an employer establishes that it knows or has reason to know that
a discriminatee is undocumented. Once an employer makes this showing,
Regions should investigate the claim by asking the Union, the charging party
and/or the discriminatee to respond to the employer's evidence. Again, a mere
assertion is not a sufficient basis to trigger such an investigation.
Id. at *4 (§ E).
93. See, e.g., Michael A. Curley, Recent Developments in National Labor Relations
Board Law, 680 PLI/Lit 573, 584-85 (2002) (emphasizing how the memorandum details the
actions that the Board may continue to take against employers who violate the NLRA); Eric
Schnapper, Righting Wrongs Against Immigrant Workers, TRIAL, Mar. 2003, at 46, 47-49
(highlighting the extent to which the memorandum asserts the Board may continue to award
remedies, despite Hoffman).
94. Policy Statement, AFL-CIO, Building Understanding, Creating Change: Defending
the Rights of Immigrant Workers (2000) [hereinafter AFL-CIO Policy], at 1-2, at
http://www.aflcio.org/issuespolitics/immigration/upload/AFLCIOPO.pdf (last visited Nov.
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Additionally, other members of the national legal community continue
to point out the limited applicability of Hoffman; specifically, that it does
not proscribe remedies under statutes other than the NLRA, for work
already performed.95
The General Counsel's memorandum and the views presented by the
AFL-CIO reflect the extreme concern for the future enforcement of federal
labor law raised by Hoffman. Nevertheless, they demonstrate as strongly
that Hoffman has by no means ended the discussion as to the proper manner
of enforcing public rights under federal labor law in accordance with
immigration law.
IV. LIMITED APPLICATION OF HOFFMAN BY THE LOWER COURTS
There has been sweeping recognition of the interdependency of labor
and immigration policies and the need to enforce them concurrently in
order to prevent this kind of "race to the bottom' 96 for employers since
Sure-Tan and particularly since Congress passed IRCA. Courts have
uniformly held that Sure-Tan was intended to be applied jointly with IRCA
to cases involving remedies of back pay for work not yet performed, but
declined to extend the decision beyond this limited area. The federal
appeals courts that had addressed the particular issue of back pay were split
as to whether Sure-Tan and IRCA should be read to prohibit awards to
undocumented immigrants altogether, or simply to limit their ability to
collect back pay, but still enabling courts to grant conditional awards. Yet
even the Seventh Circuit, which had adopted the strictest interpretation of
Sure-Tan, distinguished cases where awards might arise for work already
performed under employment statutes other than the NLRA.97  Lower
courts have consistently acknowledged the circuit split 98 and frequently
11, 2003). The organization further elaborates:
History has proven that mistreatment of one group in a workplace ultimately
will lead to the mistreatment of all workers. We must be mindful of and learn
from the history of oppression that many U.S. workers have faced, in particular
the long struggle of African American workers. All workers must understand
the difference that unions make for workers, whether it is a living wage, better
benefits or a safer work environment.
Id. at2.
95. Jac A. Cotiguala, Recent Developments of Note in the Fair Labor Standards Act,
682 PLI/Lit 383, 385-89 (2002) (articulating how Hoffman does not overrule earlier
decisions distinguishing between back pay and awards for work accomplished where the
undocumented immigrant employee can demonstrate undeniable losses).
96. E.g., Stone, supra note 11, at 813.
97. Del Rey Tortilleria v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1122 n.7 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing cases
from Second and Eleventh Circuits).
98. The Superior Court of Massachusetts acknowledged the split when it wrote:
The circuit courts that have addressed the issue of backpay and undocumented
2004] SOME EMPLOYEES ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS 417
referred to it in determining whether or not the immigrant status of an
employee might be relevant to the case.99 Some courts have even found
support under Sure-Tan, in its recognition of the employee status of
undocumented immigrants, for issuing awards to undocumented
immigrants under employment statutes other than the NLRA. 1°°
The case law since Hoffrnan suggests that the lower federal courts are
applying Hoffman as narrowly as they applied Sure-Tan in the past.
Hoffman stands only for the principle that undocumented immigrants are
ineligible for awards of back pay under the NLRA and does not determine
whether or not undocumented immigrants may be eligible for benefits and
remedies under other statutory schemes intended to protect employees.
Courts have continued to determine that awards comparable to back pay
under the NLRA would be required where the compensation would be
granted for work already performed as under the FLSA;'O° where they arose
in a context of employer discrimination under Title VII or the ADA; °2 or
for compensation for on-the-job injuries, for example in situations where it
is clear that the claim of inability to continue working stems from
circumstances entirely other than the undocumented status. The courts then
fashioned remedies largely on the basis of the federal rights at issue,
disregarding any tensions with immigration law suggested by Hoffman.
In the cases brought since Hoffnan, employers inevitably seek to use
aliens in actions arising under Title VII and the National Labor Relations Act
since the IRCA's enactment have split in their application and interpretation of
Sure-Tan. The Fourth and Seventh circuits have strictly interpreted Sure Tan
and the IRCA to prohibit awarding any back pay to an undocumented worker.
The Second, Ninth, and District of Columbia circuits, on the other hand, have
allowed some recovery. Thus, the law is unsettled regarding an undocumented
alien's ability to collect front or back pay under federal labor laws.
Urrea v. New England Tea & Coffee Co., No. CA 98-6030, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 690,
at *6-*7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2000) (citations omitted).
99. Urrea, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 690, at *8 (holding that since the employer had a
duty to demonstrate that the employee had not mitigated damages, it was entitled to know
whether or not the employee had been undocumented but only for the period during which
the employer could have been liable for back pay).
100. See, e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that
"the Supreme Court's decision in Sure-Tan weighs heavily in favor of Patel's contention
that Congress did not intend to exclude undocumented aliens from the FLSA's coverage"
given that it held that undocumented immigrants were employees under the NLRA because
not excluded, and the same reasoning applies to the FLSA). The decision is significant
because the Court held that once it had been established that the undocumented immigrant
in question was covered by the FLSA, he would receive the benefits of its full protections,
without regard to his undocumented status.
101. Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping, No. 00 C 6320, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831, at
*2 (N.D. I11. Sept. 30, 2002).
102. See De la Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237 (C.D. 11I. 2002); Lopez v.
Superflex, Ltd., No. 01 CIV. 10010(NRB), 2002 WL 1941484, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,
2002).
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the decision to argue that they are not liable for damages to their employees
if the employees are undocumented immigrants. In response to this, many
of the lower courts' most recent rulings on motions-prior to reaching the
merits-have even refused to allow employer-defendants to inquire as to
the employee's immigration status during discovery, as such information is
irrelevant for determining whether the employees rights have
transgressed.0 3 In other words, an employee's immigration status does not
alter his or her rights as an employee. In Cortez v. Medina's
Landscaping,1°4 a federal district court articulated the principle informing
many of these decisions. The court held that the employer could not
compel discovery of an employee's immigrant status under Hoffman
because,
[c]ritical to the Court's holding [in Hoffman] was the fact that the
work had not been performed and that it would have been illegal
for the plaintiffs to mitigate damages, which is required for a
back-pay award. Hoffman does not hold that an undocumented
alien is barred from recovering unpaid wages for work actually
performed.05
This practice of explicitly distinguishing, whenever possible, where an
employee's immigration status is relevant and where it is not, suggests that
the courts implicitly acknowledge the difficulties that Hoffman-by
treating the two as mutually independent-presents for labor and
immigration policies. Discussing a Pennsylvania worker's compensation
statute,106 comparable to federal protections, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed the ruling of the Workers' Compensation Appeal
Board, upholding the ruling of an administrative judge that "even
'accepting that Claimant as an alien did not have proper [INS]
documentation to work for [Reinforced Earth], such illegal alien status at
the time of injury does not bar relief to the Claimant under the [Act]."' 1 7
The Court rationalized the ruling largely on a public policy basis:
With respect to Reinforced Earth's argument that Claimant's
status as an unauthorized alien barred him from the Act's
coverage, the Board determined that Reinforced Earth failed to
prove that Claimant's alleged violation of the law-the use of
invalid documents to secure employment-was causally related
to his injury. In addition, the Board stated that any determination
that Claimant's immigration status alone would vitiate his
entitlement to compensation benefits would violate the
103. De la Rosa, 210 F.R.D. at 239.
104. Cortez, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831, at *2.
105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736 (as amended 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2626).
107. Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 101 (Pa. 2002).
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humanitarian purposes of the Act.1°8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Reinforced Earth that where
public policy dictated that a particular individual should be granted
compensation, in order to promote the interests and concerns protected by
that policy, the award could not be extinguished by a determination that,
under federal immigration law, an individual was not lawfully present or
employed in the United States. The status of one individual should be of
lesser concern than the interests of the community at large. This is exactly
the argument that the Supreme Court majority declined to consider in
Hoffman. Yet neither this decision, nor those of the lower courts, can
change the reality that Hoffman directs that federal immigration policy
should be enforced over all other laws that apply to undocumented
immigrants, regardless of public policy concerns.' °9
Therefore, under each lower court opinion that effectively refuses to
address the relationship between immigration and employment laws lurks
the reality that courts will eventually be faced with cases requiring their
simultaneous enforcement." 0 The flow of undocumented workers has only
continued to increase in the time since the passage of IRCA. The INS
estimates that throughout the 1990s, over 350,000 undocumented
immigrants established residence in the United States annually."' As the
AFL-CIO stresses, moreover, "the current system of immigration
enforcement, while failing to stop the flow of undocumented people into
the United States, is causing workplace discrimination against immigrants
and minorities, particularly undocumented workers."
'" 2
Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co."' illustrates the difficulties caused by
Hoffman. In Mendoza, the Ninth Circuit held that documented immigrant
108. Id. at 102.
109. Although Hoffman does not reach state labor regulation schemes, the Reinforced
Earth decision highlights the public policy concerns the Supreme Court majority ignored:
the purpose behind reconciling federal labor and immigration laws.
110. "The question of whether Hoffman Plastics applies only to awards of backpay and
reinstatement or whether it similarly precludes illegal immigrants from bringing suits for
punitive and compensatory damages is not before us at this time." Lopez v. Superflex, Ltd.,
No. 01 CIV. 10010(NRB), 2002 WL 1941484, at *2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002).
111. Press Release, Immigration and Naturalization Service, INS Releases Updated
Estimates of Undocumented Resident Population (Jan. 31, 2003), at http://www.
immigration.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/summaries/undocres.htm (last visited Nov. 10,
2003) ("The new report... shows that the average undocumented resident population
growth in the 1990s was 350,000 annually, roughly 75,000 per year higher than previous
estimates. The new INS estimates indicate the number of undocumented residents in the
United States in October 1996 was 5.8 million .....
112. See AFL-CIO Policy, supra note 94, at 1.
113. 301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv.
Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 383 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a company's practice of hiring
undocumented workers gave it an unfair competitive advantage by enabling it to pay its
workers substantially lower wages).
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employees could bring an action under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 1 4 against their employer based on
allegations that the employer "depressed their salaries by conspiring to hire
undocumented workers at below market wages."...5  The Ninth Circuit's
opinion provides a comprehensive picture of the clear advantages to
employers in hiring undocumented workers because of their inability to
seek enforcement of their rights as workers and how dramatically this
affects entire sectors of the economy. 116  The decision stands as an
acknowledgment of the tangible relationship between abuses of labor and
immigration law. Although it ultimately offers a possible remedy for this
particular group of workers, the Ninth Circuit, quoting the Supreme Court's
Hoffman opinion, pointedly articulates the difficulties that decision creates
in terms of dealing with such abuses through enforcement of the labor laws
themselves: "[w]e also note that the undocumented workers cannot 'be
counted on to bring suit for the law's vindication.'''. 7
The current policy among the lower courts of avoiding the potential
implications of Hoffman inevitably will lead to one of two resolutions:
either the Supreme Court will explain the extent of the applicability of its
holding in Hoffman in a future case, or Congress will take affirmative steps
to clarify the relationship it intended to craft between labor and
immigration policies. Ultimately either path should lead to congressional
action to clarify this relationship, either by dramatically revising the NLRA
or by creating a statutorily specific bridge between immigration and labor
law, to resolve exactly this kind of situation. I will argue that the best
resolution is one that provides for the extension of full protections of the
NLRA to all employees, without altering the definition of that term,
because such a policy gives employers incentives to compete legally and
responsibly while simultaneously serving the goals of federal immigration
law.
114. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
115. Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1166.
116. The Mendoza opinion states:
[T]he employees allege that the growers singularly have the ability to define
wages in this labor market, akin to monopsony or oligopsony power. They
further allege that it is the illegal scheme [of hiring undocumented workers] that
has caused their injury. The proposed amended complaint lays to rest any
remaining doubt about attributing the alleged harm to the scheme, by spelling
out a broad conspiracy causing direct harm to the workers. For example, it
makes clear that the scheme involves fruit growers that "comprise a large
percentage of the fruit orchards and packing houses in the area, and therefore
affect wages throughout the labor market."
Id. at 1171 (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 1170 (citations omitted).
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V. WHITHER CONGRESSIONAL POLICY?
Congress decidedly did not intend that IRCA or other immigration
laws should have the negative impact on national labor relations that they
will have, should the courts be forced to extend Hoffman more broadly.
Yet we have seen that even a narrow application of the Supreme Court's
decision in Hoffman will create harmful incentives for employers and
disrupt the overall legitimacy of labor relations in the United States.
Congress should therefore clarify the relationship between federal labor
and immigration policies.
Some of the more recent debate in Congress has involved how IRCA
has affected employers. There is a general acknowledgement that IRCA's
restrictions have not succeeded in reducing illegal immigration or the
hiring of undocumented immigrants. 18 Moreover, in light of the post-9/11
strictures levied upon immigrants,'19 there is a pressing need for Congress
to speak definitively on how immigration and labor policies should be read
together. Indeed, the Bush administration in effect has thrown down the
gauntlet in the form of the President's recent proposal to grant
undocumented immigrants temporary guest-worker status."E Though the
Administration has not drafted the specific details of the proposed plan,
President Bush provided an extended outline in a speech on January 7,
2004, in which he identified the four principles informing his
administration's approach to dealing with undocumented immigrants and
their role in the U.S. economy:
Our reforms should be guided by a few basic principles. First,
America must control its borders ... Second, new immigration
laws should serve the economic needs of our country. If an
American employer is offering a job that American citizens are
not willing to take, we ought to welcome into our country a
person who will fill that job ... Third, we should not give unfair
rewards to illegal immigrants in the citizenship process or
disadvantage those who came here lawfully, or hope to do so...
Fourth, new laws should provide incentives for temporary,
118. Oversight Hearing on the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair
Employment Practices Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Wade Henderson, Executive
Director, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights), available at http://www.house.gov
/judiciary/henderson032102.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
119. See Mae M. Cheng, Immigrant Registration Deadline Extended, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Feb. 16, 2003, at A17 (describing a post-9/11 immigrant registration program); Susan Sachs,
Threats and Responses: Immigration; U.S. Crackdown Sets off Unusual Rush to Canada,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at Al (describing the tightened atmosphere facing illegal
immigrants after 9/11).
120. See Excerpts from Bush's Address on Allowing Immigrants to Fill Some Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2004, at A28 [hereinafter Bush's Remarks].
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foreign workers to return permanently to their home countries
after their period of work in the United States has expired.'
2'
The actual proposal the Bush administration articulates on the basis of
these principles, however, fails to provide a satisfactory and effective
solution to the absence of undocumented workers' rights and the resulting
effects on the workplace generally throughout the United States. In order
to understand why the Bush administration's plan does not respond
appropriately or adequately to the situation, it must first be determined
what characteristics a policy fundamentally must present, in order to be
effective.
Commentators have offered a variety of resolutions. Some would
adopt the rationale implied by the Supreme Court to preclude
undocumented immigrants' receipt of any benefits of federal labor laws
that stem from their having held employment illegally. 112 Others take the
opposite stance and suggest we should grant all undocumented immigrants
full amnesty because they are already a part of our country-a part that we
depend on extensively for their contributions to our economy and
society. 2' Reflecting this understanding of our reliance on undocumented
workers, another commentator, in asserting the need for direct
congressional action, has suggested that "any solution designed to
regularize large numbers of immigrants must include a clear Congressional
121. Id.
122. An example of commentary that would restrict access of undocumented immigrants
to benefits states that:
Although notions of fairness and human decency might suggest that back pay is
an available remedy to undocumented workers, this Note concludes otherwise.
Courts should reserve back pay awards only to those employees who have a
right to be employed in the first place. There are three supporting reasons for
this conclusion. First, existing labor statutes provide alternative remedies to
rectify employer abuses. Second, back pay remedies require the employee to
mitigate damages; however, an undocumented worker cannot mitigate damages.
Finally, it is inconsistent to award conditional reinstatement simultaneously
with unconditional back pay.
Timothy M. Cox, Note, A Call to Revisit Sure-Tan v. NLRB: Undocumented Workers and
Their Right to Backpay, 30 Sw. U. L. REv. 505, 506 (2001).
123. An advocate of amnesty believes that:
The limited amnesty program proposed by this note offers a permanent solution
to the exploitation of illegal aliens in the workplace by granting amnesty, which
is limited to undocumented workers who file good faith claims based on labor
and employment law violations. The program rewards the reporting of
employer violations with citizenship, and, as a result, avoids conflict with
immigration law. In order for federal labor and employment agencies to
enforce their respective policies, they must be able to penalize employers by
compensating employees whose rights have been violated.
Hudson & Schenck, supra note 79, at 387.
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statement that U.S. labor and employment laws will be invoked to protect
the remaining undocumented population."'
124
In developing an effective policy, Congress first should identify and
reassert the historic principles informing labor law: the right of employees
to full protection of clearly defined laws; the right of employers to compete
in an open market that is not controlled by a willingness to act outside of
the boundaries of established law; and the right of the American people to a
stable employment system governed by reasonable laws rather than
harmful incentives. In other words, Congress must begin by reaffirming
that the predominant purpose of federal labor laws is to protect public
rights. In pursuit of this goal, Congress should continue to afford
individuals in the workplace opportunities to act as private attorneys
general, enforcing the mandates of employment laws against particular
employers and thereby advancing the protection of rights for all workers.
Congress should then reaffirm that the goals of immigration law are to
protect the rights of those individuals who legally immigrate to the United
States while, at the same time, preventing and discouraging illegal
immigration. Additionally, Congress must acknowledge-as it did when it
passed IRCA-that once undocumented individuals are present in this
country, entwined on a daily basis in our economic fabric, they become
interdependent with legal immigrants, permanent residents, and U.S.
citizens. Therefore, policies and laws that determine-or limit-the rights
of undocumented immigrants directly affect the rights and lives of all U.S.
residents. Even if one can make arguments against extending full legal
protections to undocumented immigrants, one cannot ignore the
repercussions of such policy decisions on the United States as a whole.
Of these goals, the Bush administration's proposal only grants
undocumented workers a limited tenure of legitimate status and does not
provide the solution Congress should be seeking. The proposal would
allow undocumented workers to pay a one-time registration fee to continue
working in the United States for three years, with the potential for renewal
of status, provided that they were holding jobs American workers refused
to fill and that they remained in good standing with their employers at all
times. 12 Individuals not currently in the United States also could obtain
temporary worker status, without paying any fee and come here to work for
the three year, renewable period, by getting a job offer from an employer
who could prove that there were no Americans willing to take the job.
Nevertheless, the administration's plan in no way would alter or reduce the
penalties imposed upon those who enter the United States illegally; nor
would the guest worker program create any new avenues toward acquiring
124. Correales, supra note 90, at 159.
125. See Bush's Remarks, supra note 120.
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permanent residence. 126 All guest workers would be required to leave the
country at the end of their terms of employment and the Administration's
plan would tie their future financial stability to this, for example, by
negotiating with those countries who wish to have their workers participate
in the program that any type of Social Security benefits for the time worked
would vest only in the home country-not the United States. 127
While some businesses have greeted the proposal with cautious
enthusiasm, those concerned with workers' and immigrants' rights have
raised numerous and significant objections to the plan.12 Among the most
prominent are that the plan still would tie workers to their employers in
ways that would discourage their bringing labor violations claims against
their employers, and moreover encourage employers to create job
conditions that no American workers would accept in order to hire cheap
labor from abroad. 129 Ultimately, critics fear that the plan "would create a
permanent, exploitable second-tier of workers who would never have the
opportunity for permanent residency and full citizenship."13 The plan does
not acknowledge in any meaningful way the contribution the
undocumented workers make daily to the formation of our American
society. It recognizes these individuals only as contributors to the Gross
Domestic Product.
13 1
The Bush administration's plan therefore avoids resolving all of the
most important issues: it does not secure undocumented workers' rights to
enforce labor laws; it does not prevent the continuing diminution of
working conditions and wages for all workers; it does not acknowledge the
significant incorporation of undocumented immigrant workers into our
overall society. Fortunately, the response from Congress suggests that both
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Steven Greenhouse, Business Cheers Bush's Plan to Hire Immigrants More
Easily, but Labor Is Wary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at All.
129. See Richard Stevenson & Steven Greenhouse, Plan for Illegal Immigrant Workers
Draws Fire From Two Sides, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at A28 (quoting statements by John
T. Sweeney, President of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. that the plan deepened "the potential for abuse
and exploitation of these workers while undermining wages and labor protections for all
workers"; and David Gray, spokesman for the Federation for Immigration Reform, stating
that "[i]t's going to have a huge downward pressure on wages and working conditions. It
will basically allow employers unfettered access to cheap exploitable workers. If they claim
they can't fill a job with an American, they can fill it with a foreign worker").
130. Greenhouse, supra note 128. See also Stevenson & Greenhouse, supra note 129
(quoting Howard Dean's statement that the plan "does nothing to place hard-working
immigrants on a path to citizenship and would create a permanent underclass of service
workers with second-class status").
131. See David Abraham, American Jobs but Not the American Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2004, at A19 (concluding that "this plan is an abandonment of America's ideals, not an
expression of them. It values immigrants' talents over their dreams. Instead of hope, it
offers them simply a job").
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the liberal and conservative members object to the proposal on numerous-
and contrasting-grounds.12 The Administration's proposal thus may have
the net positive effect of forcing Congress to step up and address these
issues proactively.
We can identify and consider the consequences of a number of
solutions, some admittedly much more desirable than others, that
nonetheless do not skirt the most significant factors of the problem the way
the Bush administration's proposal does. Hoffman most immediately
suggests that Congress should redefine "employee" to exclude all
undocumented immigrants under all federal labor and employment statutes,
on the grounds that their obtaining employment requires some breach of
federal law and cannot, therefore, be considered legitimate. Alternatively,
as a recent Harvard Law Review case note suggested,'33 Congress could
codify specific procedures whereby employers could be held financially
accountable for violating the rights of their undocumented immigrant
employees, just as they are for violations of the rights of documented-
immigrant and U.S.-citizen employees, but without extending any
financial reparations to the undocumented employees themselves. In
choosing either of these solutions, however, by qualifying either the
definition of employee or its use in practice-even putting aside all notions
of fairness to the undocumented workers themselves-Congress would
undercut the foundation of all labor and employment law and
fundamentally disrupt the relative stability of labor relations in the United
States. Once undocumented immigrants have obtained employment,
regardless of whether they have breached federal law in doing so, their
treatment by employers directly implicates the treatment received by all
other employees and necessarily impacts the entire labor market.
On the other hand, Congress could articulate a clear policy that allows
the Board to impose the same penalties on employers for violations of the
NLRA against any employee, while preventing undocumented immigrants
from collecting those benefits until they have legalized their status, as was
132. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Hill Cool to Bush Immigration Plan, WASH. POST, Jan. 11,
2004, at A06.
133. The case note author expressed the view that:
In cases such as Hoffman, in which both employer and employee are
wrongdoers, the Board's remedial inflexibility creates a tension between the
goal of employer deterrence and the equitable desire not to bestow a windfall
upon the employee. If the Board were permitted greater remedial flexibility, the
award of backpay to a third party, such as the government, would be the
Board's most sensible choice. This award would neither improperly enrich the
undocumented worker nor create a remedial structure in which the cost of
unlawfully firing an illegal alien differs vis-A-vis that of firing a legal worker.
The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Leading Cases, 116 HARV. L. REv. 392. 399 (2002).
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upheld in a number of decisions prior to Hoffman. 3 4 Congress could then
create a system for acquiring status, for example, whereby undocumented
immigrants could apply for a new category of worker visa that
acknowledged the ways they already have become incorporated into
American society. Rather than instituting a blanket amnesty provision, as
Congress did when it passed IRCA in 1986, the creation of a new category
of discretionary, employment-based visas would require undocumented
immigrants to demonstrate that they were already contributing and
committed to continuing their contributions to the United States. Issued in
conjunction with stepped-up measures to enforce the restrictions of IRCA,
Congress could create a system that discourages employment of
undocumented immigrants by removing employers' incentives to seek out
undocumented workers and further, gives those undocumented immigrants
who already have obtained jobs positive incentives and a reasonable means
to legalize their status and take the initial steps toward acquiring legal
permanent residence.
There has been at least one recent proposal for limited amnesty for
undocumented workers who have suffered violations of their employment
rights, aimed at encouraging them to report those abuses and indirectly
giving them an opportunity to demonstrate their attachment to our
society. By contrast a discretionary, employment-based visa program
that offers a path to permanent residence presents a distinct advantage over
an amnesty program because the visa program would provide
undocumented immigrants with an opportunity to proactively assert their
rights as persons within American society; rather than simply accepting
offers of empathy and regret-however deeply they may be owed these-
once they have been subjected to violations of those rights. Indeed, Senate
Democrats, in their response to the Bush Administration's proposal, have
gone so far as to assert they will offer an alternative visa plan that does
include a path to permanent residence. 
136
VI. CONCLUSION
Until either Congress or the Supreme Court takes further action, the
Board, along with federal and state courts, will have immense authority to
shape the relationship between federal labor and immigration law. The
interests of the nation are best served by a policy that recognizes both that
undocumented immigrant employees play an active and fundamental role
in our economy and society, and that the interests and rights of all
134. See, e.g., Felbro, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1985) (holding a similar solution to be in
accordance with federal immigration policy and standing precedent).
135. See AFL-CIO Policy, supra note 94, at 1.
136. Dewar, supra note 132.
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individuals in the United States will only be protected when undocumented
immigrants receive full recognition as employees. Although, at this point,
the lower federal courts seem to be shaping the law to reflect this
understanding, it is not at all clear that the Supreme Court or the 108th
Congress will accept this trend. National security concerns could easily
encourage the crafting of policies that target undocumented workers while
ignoring the implications such policies would have for all employees and,
in the long run, for the public at large. The federal courts, up to this point,
have walked a tightrope. They have emphasized that they are deciding
cases on the facts before them and not seeking to issue broad declarations
regarding the appropriate balance between federal immigration and labor
laws. Meanwhile, they have constantly called attention to the undue impact
that harshly restrictive decisions could have for all workers. When
Congress finally does articulate a clear relationship between our federal
labor and immigration laws, it will be of paramount importance that it
address how this balance implicates-in one way or another-the rights
and security of every individual in our society.
